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This poster addresses the justificatory role of conscious reflection 
within a naturalized, reliabilist epistemology. Reliabilism is the view 
that implicit, mechanistic (System 1) processes can justify beliefs, 
e.g. perceptual beliefs formed after a history of consistent 
exposure to normal lighting conditions are justified in a given 
context with normal lighting. A popular variant of reliabilism is 
virtue epistemology where the cognitive circumstances and 
abilities of an agent play a justificatory role, e.g. the cooperation of 
the prefrontal cortex and primary visual cortex of the individual 
perceiving the Müller-Lyer illusion partly justify the belief that the 
lines are equi-length. While virtue epistemology is a well-endorsed 
reliabilism for implicit beliefs, its application to explicit, consciously 
reflective (System 2) processes is more controversial. Critics ask: 
How can iterations of dumb reliabilist processes produce higher 
order justification? To respond to this concern, I draw on another 
agent-centred, normative and reliabilist epistemology—Bayesian 
epistemology. A Bayesian virtue epistemology argues that 
reflective hypothesis-testing generated by (largely) implicit 
Bayesian mechanisms offers higher order reliabilist justification for 
beliefs. Iterative Bayesian mechanisms (e.g. hierarchically nested 
probabilistic models) explain the development of higher order 
beliefs about abstract concepts such as causation, natural laws and 
theoretical entities traditionally explained by recourse to vague 
concepts such as ‘the a priori’, ‘intuition’ or ‘the intellect’. A hybrid 
Bayesian virtue epistemology offers an iterative reliabilist 
framework to explain how conscious reflection justifies beliefs. 
However, I acknowledge limitations on Bayesian accounts of 
justification such as confirmational holism, commutativity, and the 
frame problem. 
 
Virtue Epistemology 
Conclusion 
Can reliabilism explain how  
conscious reflection justifies beliefs? 
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ANIMAL KNOWLEDGE: 
System 1. Operates automatically and quickly, with little or no 
effort and no sense of voluntary control (Kahneman, 2011).  
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A Bayesian virtue account of reflective knowledge aligns with work 
in cognitive psychology on how people develop theories of how the 
mind works—the so-called ‘theory theory.’ The theory theory 
attempts to explain higher order belief revision by proposing that all 
humans, from babies to adults, come to understand the world 
abstractly by forming hypotheses and then rigorously testing them 
and updating them in light of evidence. Hypotheses explain and 
justify beliefs with higher order beliefs about causality, unobservable 
theoretical entities, relations and so on. Recently (Gopnik & 
Wellman, 2012), the ‘theory theory’ research program has merged 
with new work being done on hierarchically nested probabilistic 
models (HNPM) to show how complex thoughts can be achieved 
through iterations of the same justificatory processes that underlie 
basic probabilistic processes.  
 
 
In sum, reflective knowledge is not iterations of dumb reliabilist 
processes. New work in HNPM suggests that many aspects of 
higher-level knowledge can be created iteratively from low-level 
justificatory processes. Newer probabilistic models can restrict 
the scope of hypotheses considered and explain how multiple 
levels of knowledge can be learnt at once. Brute, reliabilist 
processes can generate reflective knowledge if they yield 
cohering beliefs across a broad explanatory domain. 
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Abstract Reliabilist Reflective 
Knowledge 
Conscious reflection: Top-down reasoning that requires attention 
and leads to understanding and explicit confidence in the 
justification of a belief. 
Naturalized: A philosophical method whereby philosophers 
consider empirical experiments and rigorous models by cognitive 
scientists rather than depend exclusively on their naïve or intuitive  
conceptions of human functioning. 
Reliablism:  “S’s belief in p is justified iff it is caused (or causally 
sustained) by a reliable cognitive process, or a history of reliable 
processes” (Goldman, . 
Virtue epistemology: A variant of reliabilism in which the cognitive 
circumstances and abilities of an agent play a justificatory role 
Bayesian epistemology: typical beliefs exist (are performed and 
evaluated) in degrees, rather than absolutes, represented as 
credence functions. 
 
Glossary 
REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: 
System 2: Allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that 
demand it, including complex computations. The operations of 
system 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of 
agency, choice, and concentration (Kahneman, 2011). 
  
 
Figure #1 An agent has animal knowledge if belief p is accurate, the 
agent is adroit, and p is accurate due to adroit processes. An agent 
has reflective knowledge p if they have animal knowledge p, p 
coheres with other beliefs and the agent has a meta-apt 
understanding of why it is true and “how in which it is sustained as 
reliably truth-conducive” (Sosa, 2009, p.138).   
 
Bayesian Virtue 
Epistemology 
Reflective knowledge: If one is to know that h, then h must be 
reliably produced, be true and the most likely amongst a set of 
plausible hypotheses hm to hn that cohere with the rest of one’s 
beliefs at lower likelihoods (Devitt, 2013). 
  
 
Knowledge 
Rational credences 
With an HNPM (as opposed to typical probability models) the same 
inputs impact multiple hypotheses across many levels of the 
network using the same Bayesian calculus to achieve layered 
outputs. HNPM can account for multiple levels of knowledge, 
including:  
 
1. Abstract generalizations relating to higher level principles 
2. Specific theories about a set of instances 
3. Particular experiences.  
 
HNPM explains how abstract generalizations arise from specific 
theories that are, in turn, learnt from particular experiences. What is 
strikingly different about these models (compared with classic 
empiricist, foundational accounts of knowledge acquisition) is that 
abstract generalizations can precede specific ones. 
 
 
Figure #2 Bayesian virtue epistemology (Devitt, 2013) values 
justification brought by reliable competencies producing both 
rational credences and knowledge.  
 
Figure #3 Children learn abstract generalizations relating to higher 
level principles, specific theories and details about particular 
experiences during the same exposure to stimuli (Gopnik & 
Wellman, 2012). 
 
Figure #4 Suppose many bags of marbles were placed in front of 
you and your job was to identify the color of the marbles in each bag 
(Gopnik & Wellman, 2012). An experimenter takes a red marble out 
of the first bag and asks you what color you think the next marble 
will be.  She then goes on removing marbles from that bag, pausing 
between each one to ask the same question, and each time the marble 
is red. The experimenter then repeats the procedure with the second 
bag of marbles. This time a succession of blue marbles appears. You 
will quickly assume that all the bags of marbles contain only one 
color. Predicting that the contents of any bag of marbles will match 
the color of the first one is an abstract generalization—an 
overhypothesis. Learning this overhypothesis precedes learning 
about the contents of bag 3 (for example, that all marbles are purple).  
 
 
 
